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1. Introduction
The creation of a monetary union in Europe on 1 January 1999 is undoubtedly one of
the  largest macro and politico-economic experiments in modern history. It was the cap stone
of the so-called ‘Maastricht Process’ designed to achieve macro economic convergence,
which had shaped monetary and fiscal policies in the countries striving for membership in
European Monetary Union (EMU) over much of the 1990s.
1 The start of EMU was marked by
the conversion of the national currencies of the member states into euros and the beginning
of the operations of the new Euro System, the new European Central Bank (ECB) and the
national central banks of the participating states (NCBs).
2 While euro cash rested in the form
of the previous national currencies for the first three years, interbank and most non-cash
payments have been denominated in euros since the start and European financial markets
quickly adopted the euro as of account. The replacement of the national currency signs by
euro cash at the start of 2002 will complete the introduction of EMU.
The new EMU has a combined population 11 percent larger than that of the US, and
a combined GDP of 61 percent of US GDP.
3 Like the US, and in sharp contrast to the
individual member states, it a fairly closed economy, whose trade with third countries is
about 20 percent of GDP. EMU has created a large financial area with a combined stock
market capitalization initially of 28 percent of that of the US and a securities market with an
initial value of about 60 percent of the US market.
4 By 2000, the combined stock market
valuation of the euro economy had risen to about 37 percent of that of the US, and its
securities market value to about 69 percent of the US market, suggesting that EMU has
stimulated financial market growth. Due to institutional and regulatory differences, financial
market integration is still less than perfect, but market-driven integration proceeds rapidly.
5  
Despite the large degree of nominal convergence achieved at the end of the 1990s,
the start of EMU was surrounded by many uncertainties. Little was known (and is) about the
properties and the stability of basic macroeconomic relations in the new monetary area such
                                                
1 For a review of fiscal policies in the EMU member states during the 1990s see Hughes-
Hallett, Strauch and von Hagen (2001).
2 In addition to the Euro system, there is also the European System of Central Banks (ESCB),
which consists of the ECB and the NCBs of the European Union member states.
3 The following data are from European Commission, European Economy Statistical Appendix
Fall 2000. EMU started with Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Germany, Finland, France, Ireland, Italy,
Luxembourg, Portugal, and Spain. Greece joined on 1 January 2001. 
4 These data are for 1998 and taken from von Hagen (1999a). 
5 See e.g. European Commission (1997), IMF (2001b) and Danthine et al. (2000).2
as its money demand function.
6 Aggregate data for the euro area were not readily available
and had to be constructed from national sources on the basis of newly developed, common
definitions. Reconstructed time series data span only one or two decades, which makes the
estimation of empirical models difficult, and even the data now available leave open serious
questions of aggregation.
7 More than two years after the start of the common monetary
policy, the first empirical macro models of the euro economy are only starting to appear.
8
Monetary policy was thus entering unknown territory. 
The institutional environment of the common monetary policy constituted further
unknown territory. By delegating the common monetary policy to the European System of
Central Banks (ESCB) and giving the ECB the task of executing the monetary policy
determined by the ESCB, the Maastricht Treaty (Art. 3 and 5 of the Statutes of the ESCB)
suggests that the ECB is subordinated to the NCBs. However, Art. 14.3 of the same statutes
holds that the NCBs are an “integral part of the ESCB and act according to the directives of
the ECB,” suggesting that the latter is superior to the former. According to the ECB, the NCB
presidents sit in the ECB Council as individuals rather than as representatives of their
individual institutions (Gaspar et al, 2001), implying that the NCB presidents would not take
into account any country-specific circumstances when making their decisions. But this
reading of the Treaty is not uncontested, as legal scholars point out that the membership of
the NCB presidents in the Council comes only as a result of their positions, not by personal
appointment (Herdegen, 1998). In view of this, how the ECB Council members, coming from
very different countries and traditions, could agree on a common monetary policy, to what
extent that policy would be affected by national circumstances and preferences, and how it
                                                
6 A number of empirical studies in the 1990s pointed to the existence of a conventional money
demand function at the EU and showed that its stability exceeded that of national money demand
functions. See e.g. Kremers and Lane (1992), Fagan and Henry (1999), Browne et al. (1997).
However, these studies are plagued with aggregation problems that made the interpretation of these
results difficult, see e.g. Wesche (1997) and Arnold and de Vries (2000), who argue that the stability of
the aggregate function is a statistical artefact.  
7 See e.g. Gaspar (2000). In public statements, the ECB’s chief economist Otmar Issing has
pointed to the difficulties created by the lack of euro-area macroeconomic data and their history, which
imples that, compared to his experience at the Bundesbank, his staff finds it much more difficult to
explain data irregularities on the basis of historical analogies and experience.
8 See Fagan et al. (2001), Coenen and Wieland (2000).3
could be communicated effectively to a very heterogeneous European public have attracted
a lot of interest in the public and academic debates preceding the start of EMU.
9   
This paper reviews the experiences of the new central bank and its monetary policy in
the early years of EMU. In section 2, we provide some institutional background. In section 3,
we discuss the ECB’s strategy and its monetary policy so far. In section 4, we look at the
evolution of monetary conditions in the euro economy and assess the central bank’s policy
on that basis. Section 5 concludes.
     
2. The ECB and the Euro System: Institutional Background
The Maastricht Treaty provides the institutional framework for the ECB. The Treaty
requires that the NCBs of all participating states must be politically independent. The ECB is
similarly independent from the governments of the member states and the political bodies of
the European Union. The ECB is owned by the NCBs.
Monetary policy decisions are made by the Governing Council (ECB Council, for
short) whose members are the NCB presidents and the six members of the ECB Board.
10
Formally, Council decisions are taken by majority vote, with each member having one vote
and the ECB president a second one in the case of a tie.  The ECB Board is responsible for
preparing the meetings of the ECB Council. In doing so, it relies on its own staff, but it also
uses the input of a number of Euro System Committees, which include staff members of the
NCBs and of which the Monetary Policy Committee is the most important one. The
established practice now is that the ECB Council members meet informally on the eve of
ECB Council meetings to discuss monetary policy developments in the euro economy. The
monetary policy discussion at the official meeting is opened with a statement by the chief
economist, which gives the Board and the chief economist in particular considerable agenda
setting power.
11 Numerous statements by the ECB president, Wim Duisenberg, indicate that
the Council takes its decision by consensus or near-consensus rather than simple majority.
In most instances, the debate seems to continue until a broad consensus is reached about
                                                
9  See von Hagen and Süppel (1994), De Grauwe et al. (1999), Dornbusch et al. (1998),
Cecchetti et al. (1999), Brückner (1997) among others.
10 The president of the European Council and a member of the European Commission have
the right to participate in ECB Council meetings.  
11 There are other indications as well that the ECB Board operates very much as a collegiate
body.  See Marshall (1999).4
the monetary policy proposal presented to the Council. In both aspects, the ECB Council
seems to follow the practice of the Bundesbank Council in earlier years (von Hagen, 1999c). 
This procedural practice is important, because it diminishes the role of the median
voter and his preferences in ECB Council decisions. The chief economist’s role as agenda
setter in monetary-policy debates implies that an NCB president proposing an alternative
policy would thus have to justify any deviation from the chief economist’s proposal and find
convincing arguments why this would serve the euro economy better. Formal voting models
show that consensus voting protects the chief economist’s proposal against alternatives.
Assuming that the chief economist always argues from an aggregate, euro-area perspective,
the established procedure thus assures that country specific preferences and asymmetric
shocks hitting individual member countries, which might be reflected in proposals submitted
by individual NCBs, do not affect the common monetary policy in significant ways (von
Hagen, 1999b).
12
A significant feature of the Treaty is that it mandates the ECB to regard price stability
as the principal objective of monetary policy, a heritage from a similar mandate in Germany’s
Bundesbank Act. But the Treaty does not define what price stability means in operational
terms. The independence of the central bank as defined in the Treaty implies that such a
definition can only be supplied by the ECB itself, a point we return to later. The principal
mandate is qualified (Art. 105(1)) by the call to support the general economic policy in the
European Community contribute to the policy goals defined in Art 2 as long as this does not
compromise the goal of price stability. As in the Bundesbank case, where a similar
qualification exists, this can be expected to remain inconsequential for the ECB: First,
because it relates to “general” policies rather than specific actions of the governments,
second because it relates to economic policy “in” rather than “of” the Community and there
are at least fifteen different ones of the former. The view presented in Issing et al (2001), that
the ECB does not regard output stabilization as a secondary goal for monetary policy, is
                                                
12 Note that given this procedure, the chief economist’s power to shape Council decisions
increases as the number of NCB presidents on Council increases. This is because, in a larger Council,
any deviation from the chief economist’s proposal must win more votes to be adopted. In contrast to
Alesina et al. (2001), who simply assume that the ECB Council decides by majority vote, we conclude
that the actual procedure implies that future enlargements of EMU will strengthen the power of the
ECB Board in monetary policy decisions.  5
consistent with this.
13 The European Parliament, through its Committee on Monetary and
Financial Affairs, has repeatedly called upon the ECB to explain its goals and intentions
under Art. 105(1). So far, the ECB has denied such explanations which could be read as
commitments to other monetary policy goals in addition to price stability.   
While monetary policy decision-making is centralized in the ECB Council, the actual
implementation of monetary policy is largely decentralized. Key features of ECB monetary
policy operations are the imposition of an interest-bearing reserve requirement on bank
deposits, the provision of automatic-access lending and deposit facilities for banks at the
Euro System at prefixed interest rates, which establish a floor and a ceiling for overnight
money market rates, and repurchase operations (Repos), i.e., reversible open market
operations in eligible securities, as the main tool for creating central bank money. So far, the
ECB has almost completely refrained from outright open market purchases or sales or
foreign exchange market interventions. The provision that reserves averaged over a month
are counted against the reserve requirement assures that the daily volatility of money market
rates remains low even without frequent central bank interventions.
This design reflects the desire to involve the NCBs as much as possible in the actual
implementation of the common monetary policy, which is mandated by the ESCB Statutes.
Apart from the institutional interest in keeping high staff numbers (Marshall, 1999), there is
probably a strategic motivation for this. Frequent money market interventions would be
difficult to coordinate among the national central banks and would, therefore, create a
tendency for centralized operations. An ECB permanently active in the market would be in a
much stronger position relative to the NCBs in determining the course of monetary policy.
Being active in the market between ECB Council meetings would allow the ECB Board to
confront the Council with interest rate developments that would be difficult to reverse without
upsetting the markets.  The NCBs probably resisted such a design fearing a loss of influence
over the common monetary policy.
14 
  
                                                
13  Specifically, Issing et al. express doubts about the power of monetary policy to
systematically stabilize output and argue that low inflation is the ECB’s best contribution to real growth.
14 It is interesting to observe that the Bundesbank Council in the 1970s rejected a Bundesbank
Board proposal for a more active open market policy on exactly these grounds. See von Hagen
(1998).6
3. Monetary Policy Strategy
3.1. The ECB’s Monetary Policy Strategy
Monetary policy strategies can be regarded from different perspectives. Monetary
economists typically focus on optimal-control type arguments. Assuming that the central
bank wishes to minimize a quadratic loss function defined over inflation (and, possibly, some
other variables), the question posed is how to achieve the smallest control-error variance.
From this perspective, a strategy serves primarily to deal with the time lags and uncertainties
in the link between the central bank’s instruments and its objectives. A key issue then is the
choice of an intermediate target, a variable that can be observed faster and more frequently
than the ultimate target variables. Under an intermediate target strategy, keeping the
intermediate target on some target path over time helps the central bank to achieve its
ultimate targets. The preparatory work of the ECB’s institutional precursor, the European
Monetary Institute (EMI, 1997) had narrowed the ECB’s strategy choices in this regard to the
alternatives of monetary targeting or inflation forecast targeting.
A second perspective is the importance of a strategy for communicating with the
public. A strategy provides a framework for explaining current and defending past central
bank actions in public (Gaspar et al., 2001). The EMI’s (1997) list of “general principles” for
assessing a monetary policy strategy emphasized this aspect: A strategy must convey the
impression that the central bank can and intends to pursue a well-defined medium-term
objective, it must enhance accountability through the formulation and announcement of
targets; it must be sufficiently transparent for the public to understand why the central bank
adopted a given policy; and it must be compatible with central bank independence. Issing et
al. (2001, p. 34) argue that the adoption of a strategy is an “attempt to characterize to the
best possible extent, given the imperfect knowledge of the economy, how the central bank
will respond to the arrival of new information.” From this angle, the public announcement of a
strategy is important to gain credibility.   
The third perspective considers the role of a monetary strategy for regulating the flow
of information and structuring the deliberations within the central bank. From this angle, a
strategy shapes the decision making processes, with important implications for the
distribution of strategic powers in the central bank (see Tietmeyer, 1996; von Hagen, 1999c;7
Gaspar et al, 2001). In this vein, the ECB (2001, p. 46) explains the purpose of strategy as
assuring that monetary policy decisions are made in a consistent and coherent way.
In October 1998, the ECB (1998, 1999) presented its strategy. It is based on a
definition of price stability, and two “Pillars” that form the basis for the assessment of current
developments and interest-rate decisions. 
3.1.1. Price Stability
The ECB defines price stability as an annual increase in the ‘Harmonized CPI,’ its
main gauge of average inflation in the euro area, below two percent. Initial doubts in the
public debate that this implied a tolerance for deflation were soon rejected. The two-percent
limit on inflation is another heritage from former Bundesbank practices. Issing et al (2001)
point out that it is also in agreement with the stated preferences of European governments as
expressed several times in the European Council’s “Broad Economic Guidelines.” 
Like the Bundesbank in the past, the ECB regards price stability thus defined as a
goal to be achieved only in “the medium run,” a period of unspecified length. This implies that
it would tolerate temporary moves of inflation outside the target range. The lack of an
operational definition of the “medium term” is a visible contrast to the practice of central
banks pursuing explicit inflation targets in recent years. For example, the Bank of England’s
inflation target is for annual inflation two years ahead. The Bank of Sweden (1997, p. 27)
writes that “The Riksbank has formulated [its objective] as limiting the annual increase in the
price level to 2 percent, ...”. The ECB’s unwillingness to define a more precise time horizon
for its goal of price stability has been criticized by several authors arguing that the vagueness
of the “medium run” reduces the public’s ability to form expectations about future price and
monetary developments and that it deflects accountability (e.g. Gali, 2001).
Specifying the time horizon over which price stability is to be reached touches on two
issues. The first is an optimal-control question: Given a shock causing a rise in inflation, how
should the adjustment to this shock be distributed over time? The answer to this question
depends on the central bank’s preferences and the properties of the economy. Smets (2000)
and the papers discussed there show that the optimal horizon is a function of the relative
weight of price stability compared to output stability in the central bank’s loss function. Given
the ECB’s unambiguous mandate for price stability, this suggests that it should aim at a
rather short horizon. Smets also shows that the optimal time horizon becomes shorter, if the
economy is more ‘forward-looking’, i.e. forward looking expectations dominate backward8
looking expectations embodied in wage contracts and price setting, and if the slope of the
Phillips curve increases. One might argue that the ECB wanted to avoid a more specific
definition of its time horizon because of its uncertainty about the empirical characteristics of
the euro economy in these regards. 
The second issue is whether price stability is regarded as a (not necessarily constant)
price level target or a target only for the inflation rate, i.e., whether or not it is compatible with
base drift in the price level. Faced with a non-monetary shock to the price level, a central
bank targeting the inflation rate would allow base drift and merely aim at bringing inflation
back to its target. In contrast, a central bank pursuing a price level target would have to bring
the price level back to its target path and, therefore, engage in a stronger and longer-lasting
monetary contraction.
15 In view of this, price level targets have traditionally been regarded as
inappropriate as they would cause greater variability in output, inflation and interest rates.
Recent studies, however, suggest that they may have superior stabilization properties at low
inflation and nominal interest rates.
16 Smets (2000) finds that the optimal time horizon for a
price level target is generally longer than the optimal time horizon for an inflation target.
Given that the total monetary response to an inflationary shock is larger under a price level
target, avoiding excessive output instability calls for distributing it over a longer time period. 
The difference between targeting inflation and targeting the price level matters also
for reasons of political economy. Price level targeting provides those who are negatively
affected by rising prices with better protection against the consequences of fiscal expansions
and does so at some cost to those benefitting from expansions in output. Therefore, the
choice between targeting inflation or the price level requires a value judgement from the
central bank (Fischer, 1996). Unless they share this value judgement, targeting the price
level may lead to more intense conflicts between the governments and the central bank. 
From this perspective, the ECB’s unwillingness to make its target horizon for price
stability more precise may reflect its unwillingness to reveal its choice between targeting
inflation and targeting the price level and the desire to leave room for a flexible choice of the
distribution of monetary policy responses to fiscal and other shocks over time. A priori,
                                                
15 Note that, as long as the target path of the price level is positively sloped,  this does not
imply that the central bank has to force a reduction in the price level. Instead, it can maintain a lower
growth rate until the target path is met again.
16 See e.g. Svensson (1999). An example would be a deflationary shock to the price level,
which, given a price level target, triggers an increase in inflation expectations and a decline in the real
interest rate.9
aiming at annual headline inflation below two percent “in the medium run” is compatible with
both targeting the average inflation rate and allowing for base drift and with targeting the
price level along a path with a slope below two percent. With no further explanation, the
observer can only find out with hindsight, possibly over a lengthy time period, how the central
bank reacted to non-monetary shocks to the price level. Interestingly, the Bundesbank’s past
policies following the bursts of inflation on the 1970s and the early 1990s seemed consistent
with a price level objective, although the Bank never made this objective explicit (von Hagen,
1995). In view of this, a suggestive interpretation of the ECB’s unwillingness to clearly define
a target horizon is the hope that this imprecision would allow the bank to pursue a more
ambitious target with less political resistance. The drawback is that the beneficial, stabilizing
effects on inflation expectations will only come about once the public has fully understood the
central bank’s true intentions through experience.    
3.1.2. The First Pillar
The key characteristic of the First Pillar is the announcement of a reference value for
the annual growth rate of a broad monetary aggregate, M3. The term “reference value“ rather
than target serves to indicate that the ECB does not target M3 in a rigid, mechanical sense.
Like the Bundesbank’s earlier practice, the assessment of monetary developments does not
focus narrowly on M3 growth but includes other monetary and credit aggregates. A further
similarity is the derivation of the reference value on the basis of a simple velocity equation.
The reference value takes the growth rate of potential output less an assumed velocity trend
as a starting point and adds the implicit target inflation rate. In October 1998, the assumed
growth rate of potential output was 2.0 – 2.5%, while the assumed trend in velocity was a
decline of (-0.5) – (-1.0)%. The announced reference value was 4.5% (ECB, 1999). Taking
midpoints for the growth rate estimates implies a target inflation rate of 1.5%. 
At first glance, the ECB’s First Pillar seems to look like the Bundesbank’s flexible
monetary targeting in the past.
17 The Bundesbank repeatedly affirmed that it was willing to
tolerate temporary deviations from its monetary target (a two-percent corridor for annual M3
growth), if this was deemed compatible with low inflation. Nevertheless, monetary targets
were a good predictor of money growth in the medium run (Neumann and von Hagen, 1993).
However, the ECB has frequently emphasized that it does not regard M3 growth as an
                                                
17 Marshall (1999, p. 278) quotes Tietmeyer proposing this view.10
intermediate target at all. ECB (2001, p 48) states that „the ECB does not attempt to keep M3
growth at the reference value at any particular point in time by manipulating interest rates.“
The ECB has explained that it deems monetary targeting as inappropriate for fear of
instabilities in the demand for money and measurement problems with monetary aggregates
(ECB 2001, p.48). The repeated emphasis of the differences between the reference value
and (even a flexible form of) monetary targeting reject the allegation of Alesina et al. (2001)
that the First Pillar simply serves to pretend that the ECB conducts its monetary policy like
the Bundesbank in the past. Instead, the reference value serves as a yardstick to assess
risks the central bank’s ultimate target, inflation. This gives M3 growth and monetary
developments the status of information variables in monetary policy decisions.
 
3.1.3. The Second Pillar
The Second Pillar consists of a „broadly-based assessment of the outlook for future
price developments“ in parallel with the First Pillar (ECB, 1998). Initially, the Second Pillar
represented an analysis of short-run price developments in the euro area, based on a large
and unspecified number of economic and financial variables, including measures of real
activity, wage cost, asset prices, fiscal policy indicators, and indicators of business and
consumer confidence (ECB 1999). No framework was specified how these variables would
be used to assess price developments, nor their relative weights in such assessments. The
Second Pillar thus adds an opaque part to the ECB’s strategy. Issing et al. (2001, p. 74)
explain that the relative importance of these variables changes all the time and that there is
„no permanently valid way to organize the assessment in a logically consistent manner.“  
The nature of the Second Pillar appears to have changed since the introduction of the
Second Pillar. Angeloni et al. (1999) and Issing et al. (2001) drop business and consumer
confidence indicators and instead add inflation expectations derived from asset prices and
market surveys to the elements of the Second Pillar. Gaspar et al. (2001, p. 13) explain that
„analysis [under the Second Pillar] is typically centered on the effects of interactions between
supply and demand and / or cost pressures on pricing behavior.“ In contrast to Issing’s et al.
explanation, this suggests that the analysis is indeed organized in some consistent11
framework of analysis. The ECB’s (2001) explanation of the staff projections, which it started
to publish in its Monthly Bulletin in December 2000, supports that view.
18 
One interpretation of this gradual development of a more consistent framework under
the Second Pillar is that it is becoming equivalent to inflation forecast targeting. The benefit
of such an interpretation is that it increases the transparency of this Pillar. However, Gaspar
et al. (2001) reject this interpretation and the ECB (2001) explains that it does not regard
inflation forecast targeting as a sufficient framework for monetary policy. Like the First Pillar,
the Second Pillar is merely a collection of information variables used to assess risks to price
stability. Thus, the ECB’s strategy is best characterized as a direct-targeting approach.  
3.1.3. Reconciling the Two Pillars
 The presentation of the Two Pillars has left ECB observers and commentators
puzzled and Issing et al. (2001) acknowledge at least partially that the Two-Pillar structure
makes the strategy hard to comprehend. Part of the confusion resulted from the
commentator’s own wish to read the Two-Pillar strategy as an intermediate-target strategy in
disguise (either monetary or inflation forecast targeting.) Accepting that it is not still raises
two questions: Why are there two Pillars rather than a unified framework for analysing risks
to price stability; and, given that there are two Pillars, what is their relative weight in ECB
monetary policy decisions? 
According to the ECB, the Two-Pillar structure reflects the fundamental uncertainty
about its macro economic environment and the transmission of monetary policy. ECB (2001,
p 54) explains that it was chosen because of the multiplicity of „models“ of the transmission
process in the current literature, some of which emphasize „the role of money“ for inflation,
while other emphasize „non-monetary factors.“ The First Pillar thus stands for models
reserving a prominent role for money in the central bank‘s analysis of threats to price
stability. This role is justified by the claim that „inflation is ultimately a monetary
phenomenon“ (ECB 1999, p. 47). The ECB frequently points to the close correlation between
                                                
18 These projections are conditional forecasts based on the assumption of no policy change.
As noted by Gali (2001) the December projections have rather low precision. For example, the
projected HICP inflation rate for 2001 is 1.8-2.8 percent. The ECB explains that this range
corresponds to twice the average absolute error of previous forecasts. This translates into a
confidence level of 57 percent (Gali, 2001). Applying a more conventional 95 percent confidence band
would correspond to a range of 0.7 – 3.9 percent. It may be, of course, that due to the shortage of
data the ECB just can’t do better.12
money growth and inflation in the medium and long run to support that claim (e.g., Issing et
al. 2001, ECB 2001). The Second Pillar, in contrast, makes room for models of inflation that
focus on other aspects of the macro economy such as output, demand, and labor market
conditions and asset prices, and that have a more short-term orientation. 
At a closer look, however, this distinction between the First and the Second Pillar
seems more artificial than helpful. Taken literally, a „First-Pillar model“ would have to be one
where the link between money growth and inflation does not operate through the interaction
of aggregate demand and supply. Not even a classical model with fully flexible prices would
have that property. While for expository convenience such models are often presented as
saying that the price level „clears“ the money market, this is just a short-cut through a
transmission process in which a monetary expansion works its way through the entire
economy. Similarly, models of the new Keynesian and new Neoclassical syntheses are often
written in ways that hide the importance of monetary aggregates because these are not the
focus of the analysis, but it is certainly true that monetary policy plays an essential role in
them and that they embed correlations between money growth and inflation. Under any
reasonable interpretation, such models would, therefore, fall under the First Pillar, too. But
then „Second-Pillar models“ would have to give no role to money and monetary policy for
inflation at all. It seems unlikely that this is what the ECB has in mind. If not, it is hard to see
how the expository differences between models commonly used in the academic and policy
debates in the past decade support a substantive distinction between the two Pillars.
Some authors have taken this conclusion as a reason for arguing that the ECB should
abolish its First Pillar and disregard monetary aggregates altogether in its assessment of
risks to price stability (Gali 2001, Alesina et al. 2001). Two points are commonly made to
support this claim. The first is that monetary variables have little or no information value for
inflation over other variables in Granger causality tests. The fallacies of this argument are
well known. Suppose the central bank manipulates interest rates to steer money growth in
ways to achieve price stability. Variations in the interest rate then carry (most of) the
information about variations in monetary aggregates and the marginal information value of
such aggregates is unsurprisingly low. Furthermore, the closer inflation is kept to its target,
the smaller the information value in the variables used to steer it, unless the target varies
systematically with other variables. Thus, causality regressions have no relevance for the
value of monetary variables in the assessment of inflation risks.13
The second point commonly made is that recent macro-economic models do not
assign money a „special“ role in the transmission process of monetary policy. The fallacy of
this argument is that it confuses statements about the language of economists (i.e., modeling
conventions) with empirical hypotheses, and that the former are obviously not relevant to the
policy issue. A related point, noted by Gali (2001) is that the long-run correlation between
money growth and inflation, emphasized in the ECB’s justification of the First Pillar, does not
prove any causality from money to prices. This is trivially true, since causality is a theoretical
concept, not an empirical one (Cooley and LeRoy, 1985). Its theoretical strength cannot be
decided from data and depends, among other things, the central bank’s own policy. In sum,
the grounds for neglecting monetary variables in the analysis of risks to price stability
presented in the current debate are weak.
19
In contrast to ECB reasoning, model uncertainty does not justify the unwillingness to
specify the relative weights of the two Pillars, either, as Issing et al. (2001) argue. If the
central bank has a probability distribution over all economic models considered, this
distribution defines the relative weights of the individual models in the decision making
process. These weights ought to be relatively stable or vary in systematic ways that can be
communicated. Brunner and Meltzer (1969) discuss model uncertainty in the sense that
several, non-nested alternatives are available and the central bank has no prior probabilities
for their validity. They argue that policy makers should adopt a mini-max strategy under such
circumstances, i.e. monetary policy should aim at minimizing the largest possible damage
under all alternative models considered. This is nicely formalized in von zur Muehlen
(2001).
20 If this is the type of uncertainty the ECB is concerned with, optimal decision making
results in rules that could be communicated in much clearer ways.
In sum, the recourse to model uncertainty does not yield a convincing justification of
the Two-Pillar structure. The proper interpretation of the strategy, therefore, ought to lie
elsewhere. Recall the ECB’s explanation, that the strategy serves to structure internal
debates and communication with the public. From this perspective, assigning a „prominent“
role to money under the First Pillar is primarily a statement about what the ECB thinks it is, or
                                                
19 A number of recent papers argue that the neglect of monetary aggregates in the conduct of
monetary policy can result in rather unpleasant outcomes in precisely the type of models advocates of
abolishing money from the set of variables the ECB should look at have in mind; see Christiano and
Rostagno (2001) and the literature cited there.
20 For a treatment of robust optimal control in forward-looking monetary policy models, see
Hansen and Sargent (2000).14
it should be, responsible for. Building on the proposition that „inflation is ultimately a
monetary phenomenon“ the prominent role assigned to monetary aggregates and their
analysis under the First Pillar indicates a responsibility for avoiding situations in which large
and lasting expansions or contractions of monetary aggregates would result in bouts of
inflation or deflation. In other words, the First Pillar signals a commitment to avoiding
monetary policy errors resulting from uncontrolled monetary developments.  
Viewed in this way, the First Pillar is much less than monetary targeting. In particular,
it does not constrain monetary policy much as long as money growth rates remain in an
acceptable range around the reference value. But the monetary reference value could still
serve to structure the internal policy debate in the ECB Council. The ECB’s Monthly Reports,
which always begin with an analysis of monetary developments, reflect this point.
Discussing monetary developments and how they would be affected by current interest rate
policy regularly assures that policymakers in the central bank hold the medium-run
consequences of their decisions in perspective. In the Bundesbank’s earlier experience,
monetary developments gained importance relative to other considerations in times of
protracted monetary expansions and thus induced the Bundesbank to tighten monetary
policy before inflation accelerated (von Hagen, 1999c). In our interpretation, the ECB’s First
Pillar thus serves as a commitment device disciplining the ECB Council against uncontrolled
accelerations or decelerations of money growth, and a signal to the general public that the
ECB will watch over monetary developments in this way. The Second Pillar then serves
merely as an assurance that the ECB will not narrowmindedly neglect other, relevant
information in the conduct of monetary policy. Interestingly, such an interpretation comes
close to Christiano and Rostagno’s (2001) recent proposal of a money growth constraint on a
monetary policy characterized by a Taylor rule. These authors show that such a constraint
anchors long-run inflation expectations and reduce the risk of indeterminacies and high-
inflation equilibria that can arise from central bank policies following Taylor rules. Equally
interesting, however, their analysis suggests that the ECB should frame its First Pillar in
terms of a lower and an upper bound of money growth rates rather than a „reference value“. 
The interpretation of the Two-Pillar strategy as a device for structuring debates within
the central bank also explains why the ECB does not specify the relative weights of the two
Pillars. First, the nature of the First Pillar implies that its weight should be variable: small in
normal times and gaining importance in times of run-away monetary expansions. Second,
Issing et al. (2001, p. 89) explain that, „from a procedural viewpoint, the synthesis“ [between15
the two Pillars] „begins to take place first and foremost at the moment in which the analyses
and options are elaborated and presented to the ECB decision making bodies“. Since this
presentation is made by the chief economist, this means that weights are defined by the chief
economist. Using the same weights consistently would increase the transparency of the
strategy at this stage, but make the chief economist unable to use the information
strategically in the ECB Council and determine the relative importance of medium and short-
run considerations himself. Not committing to a priori weights strenghtens the leadership of
the chief economist over the NCB presidents at Council meetings. 
In this interpretation, the First Pillar of the strategy serves to assure the public of the
ECB’s medium-term orientation of avoiding any contribution of monetary policy to inflation.
The opacity of the Second Pillar and its relation to the first one, however, hardly make this
strategy an effective framework of communicating the ECB’s shorter-run intentions to the
public. This may be the price for achieving the strategic purposes in the internal decision
making processes.     
3.2. The Strategy at Work: Monetary Policy Decisions 1999-2001
Many observers had expected the ESCB to start its monetary policy by pushing up
interest rates even if that was not justified by economic conditions, in order to prove that it
was hard-nosed on inflation (e.g. Dornbusch et al., 1998). The opposite happened. In a
concerted step generally considered the Euro System’s first policy action, all NCBs reduced
their interest rates to 3 percent on 3 December 1998.
21 While this could still be regarded as a
reaction to the Russian financial crises, the rate cut on 8 April 1999 cannot, as all economies
of the euro area except Germany and Italy had recovered from the 1999 slowdown by then.
22
As shown in Table 1, the April 1999 rate cut came in the presence of a money growth rate
that was slightly too high, and low but rising inflation rates. The ECB reversed its course in
November 1999. It first raised its rate by 50 then by another 100 basis points distributed over
the following 12 months. The upward move over the year 2000 was accompanied first by
increasing money growth rates, which started to fall only in the Summer of that year. Inflation
                                                
21 The Bank of Italy cut its rate to 3.5 percent and to 3.0 percent later that month. See Gaspar
(2000) for a review of this action.
22 Gaspar (2000) explains that move as a protection against deflationary risks in the euro area,
although signs of inflation creeping up already existed.16
continued to increase until the Fall of 2000 and remains significantly above the two-percent
ceiling set by the ECB. The ECB cut rates again in a surprise move in May 2001. 









12/08/98 -30 -30 5.84 0.8
04/08/99 -50 -80 5.26 1.1
11/05/99  50 -30 6.06 1.5
02/03/00  25 -05 6.11 2.0
06/08/00  50 45 5.37 2.4
10/05/00  25 70 5.11 2.7
05/10/01 -25 45 4.51 (April) 3.4
Recent literature has shown that Taylor rules are useful for describing and
interpreting central bank policies under very diverse circumstances.  The simple Taylor rule
(Taylor, 1993) has found considerable attention as a benchmark rule for the ECB (see, e.g.,
Peersman and Smets, 1999, Taylor 1998), since it found empirical support for the euro area
before the introduction of the euro (see, e.g., Gerlach and Schnabel, 2000). Moreover, Taylor
rules are also explicitly employed as a benchmark by parts of the financial press, e.g., by the
Financial Times Deutschland.
23 We base our exercise on the following specification:     
(1)          t t y 2 . 0 ) π ( 2 . 1 0 . 4 i
ob
t + − + =π
where  t i ,  t π , 
ob π  , and  t y  denote the nominal money market interest rate, the
inflation rate, the inflation objective of the Central Bank, and the output gap.  We set 
ob π
=1.5%, the value implicitly used by the ECB for their calculation of the reference value for
M3, and assume an equilibrium interest rate of 4.0%, the sum of the ECB’s assumed long-
run real GDP growth rate and the inflation objective. The coefficients of this Taylor rule are
similar to empirical estimates for the Bundesbank prior to EMU, a plausible starting point for
the ECB (e.g. Faust et al. 2001). One advantage of this parameterization is that it yields a
value of the Taylor rule for the euro area of 3% in December 1998, which corresponds to the
actual value. In contrast to Faust et al., we use the current rather than an expected future
inflation rate in the Taylor rule. Using an expected rate would not change the results below
                                                
23 Alesina et al. (2001) and Faust et al. (2001) present similar studies of ECB monetary policy
based on Taylor rules.17
significantly, but calculating expected inflation rates from the data would force us to shorten
the sample. In sum, we regard the specification of equation (1) as a plausible benchmark.
A well known problem in applying Taylor rules is the measurement of output gaps. In
fact, the measurement problem is used as justification why the weight of output gaps is lower
than the one on inflation (Smets, 1998). Measuring output gaps is even more of a problem in
the euro area, where data concerning output is rather inaccurate and released rather late.
Here, we used simple interpolations of several output gap estimates to increase the
robustness of our measure. The estimates are from the OECD (OECD, 2001), IMF (IMF,
2001) and two series of estimates from the European Commission (EU, 2000 and 2001). 
In Figure 1, we plot the Taylor rule from equation (1), labeled “euro”, together with the
ECB’s main financing rate (“main rate”.) The benchmark Taylor rule does not describe ECB
interest rate decisions well over the time period from January 1999 onwards, as the actual
rate was continuously lower than the rate implied by the Taylor rule. The difference between
the two rates is not well explained by interest rate smoothing, either. Under interest rate
smoothing, the actual rate would adjust to the rate implied by the Taylor rule in a gradual
way, i.e., 
(2)  ) 2 . 0 ) π ( 2 . 1 0 . 4 )( 1 ( i
ob
1 t t t t y i + − + − + = − π λ λ ,
where λ > 0.  Figure 1, however, shows that the actual rate and the rate calculated
from our Taylor rule move in opposite directions in at least two instances.    
Figure 1: Taylor rules for the Euro Area I
How can the difference between the actual rate and the plausible benchmark be
explained. As noted above, pre-EMU literature has placed much attention on the voting
behavior of the NCB presidents on the ECB Board. If ECB Council decisions were taken by
simple majority, the median NCB president would have considerable influence on them.
Inflation rates in the EMU exhibited quite a large degree of cross-country variation during the
period under consideration, as illustrated in Figure 2. This could move the ECB’s interest rate
away from the benchmark. To evaluate this possibility, we calculate individual Taylor rules
based on equation (1) using individual country data, and compute the median Taylor rate for18
each period. In Figure 1, we plot this rate, labeled “median.” The actual rate set in December
1998 corresponded exactly to the choice of the median NCB president. Following that,
however, the median rule would have implied a much faster and larger rise in interest rates
responding to the larger increase in the median inflation rate and the median output gap in
the euro area. Thus, Figure 1 confirms that the median NCB president does not play a large
role in shaping interest rate decisions.
Figure 2: Standard Deviation of Inflation Rates in the Euro Area
 Another possibility is that the Council gives particular weight to the circumstances of
the two largest economies, Germany and France. To explore this, we average the rates
calculated from equation (1) for these two countries. The two rates are quite similar during
this period, since Germany had lower inflation rates but also a lower output gap than France.
The resulting rate, labeled “D-F”, is shown in Figure 1. It does more to explain the actual
interest rate than the original Taylor rule (“euro.”) Interestingly, the ECB’s first interest rate
move in April 1999 pushed the actual rate closer to the “D-F” rate. The subsequent
movements in the actual rate seem quite consistent with a smooth adjustment of the actual
rate to that implied by “D-F.” There is, thus, some suggestive evidence supporting the idea
that the ECB Council places more weight on the economic developments in Germany and
France. 
Occasionally it is argued that the ECB cares for core inflation instead of headline
inflation. In figure 2, we show a Taylor rule with HICP replaced by core inflation, measured as
HICP minus food and energy prices (“core 1”). Due to the much flatter movements of core
inflation over this period, the resulting Taylor rate is much flatter and misses the movements
of the actual rate more than our first benchmark. A variation of this alternative is to replace
headline by core inflation in the calculation of the Taylor and increase the weight on the
output gap. This follows the conjecture by Faust et al from a similar exercise, that the ECB
places more weight on output stabilization than the Bundesbank did in the past. Assuming a
weight of 0.8 for output yields the rate labeled “core-2” in figure 2. This rule tracks the
observed rate quite well between the start of EMU and early 2000. For most of the year
2000, however, the actual rate then followed the “D-F” line more closely and moved away
from the “core-2” line. Only the ECB’s May 2001 interest rate move seemed to follow the
“core-2” line more than the “D-F” line. There is, then, some preliminary evidence in the data19
also that ECB’s interest rate policy gave more weight on output stabilization than our original
benchmark as suggested by Faust et al.
For a more formal test, we consider the regressions reported in Table 2, where the
dependent variable is the actual interest rate
Table 2: Estimated Interest Rate Rules
(1) (2)
Constant -0.23   (-0.62) 0.03   (0.13)
D-F 0.29   (2.73) 0.15   (2.67)
Core-2 0.85  (4.04)
Lagged main rate 0.84   (12.64)




Note: Number of observations = 32, dependent variable is “main rate.” ρ is the first-order
residual autocorrelation. Numbers in parentheses are t-ratios.
The first regression suggests that the ECB’s interest rate policy can be explained as a
mix of a Taylor rule for Germany and France and a Taylor rule focusing on core inflation and
giving a relatively large weight to the euro area output gap. However, the residual
autocorrelation is very high for this regression. The second regression models follows the
interest-rate smoothing model and has the actual rate depend on its own lag and the Taylor
rule for Germany and France. The table shows that this model explains the actual rate very
well, and leads to a residual autocorrelation which is almost zero.
24 Adding “core-2” to this
equation yields a negative, statistically insignificant coefficient for that variable. As a result,
the ECB’s policy is best described as following a Taylor rule focused on developments in
Germany and France, augmented by a tendency for interest rate smoothing.
Our interpretation of these findings is that the ECB Board succeeded in emancipating
itself quickly from the median country’s perspective on monetary policy, and it did so by
giving more weight to a policy responding to developments in France and Germany. The fact
that the Taylor rules for Germany and France consistently called for lower rates than the
median country’s Taylor rule may have helped the ECB Board, as the resulting policy was
less proactive than a policy focusing on euro area aggregates. The relatively large weight
Germany and France seem to receive in ECB interest rate decisions may reflect the
acknowledgment of the other Council members of the importance of these two countries for20
European integration.  Alternatively, it may reflect a shared view of the ECB Council that
these two economies, which together represent half of the euro economy, reflect the medium
run developments of the euro area better than aggregate euro-area data used to compute
the euro-area Taylor rule. Whether or not that is true is an empirical question that remains to
be resolved.     
 
4. Monetary Relations in the Euro Area
In this section, we review the monetary developments in the euro area so far. We are
mainly interested in two questions. First, is the link between money and prices empirically
stable enough to support a monetary policy strategy focusing on money? Second, how did
the ECB’s monetary policy perform so far?  
4.1. Money Demand
A number of empirical studies in the 1990s investigated the existence of a stable
long-run money demand function for broad monetary aggregates at the EMU level, see e.g.
Browne et al. (1997), Hayo (1999), Fagan and Henry (1999), Coenen and Vega (1999) and
Brand and Cassola (2000). Generally, they conclude that the stability of money demand at
the level of the monetary union is greater than the stability of national money demand
functions. Broad money demand is found to have standard properties, i.e., long-run real
income and price level elasticities of unity and a negative and significant elasticity with
respect to the yield on alternative financial assets.
In Hayo et al. (1998), we have estimated a money demand function for M3 based on
a cointegrating framework, using quarterly data data from 1979 – 1997. e use that estimate
to derive the following, long-run money demand function for the euro area:
(3) mt - pt  = yt – 0.023it ,
where m, p, and y are the logs of the money supply, the GDP deflator, and real GDP,
respectively, and i is the yield on 10-year government bonds in the euro area. Hayo (1999)
finds a similar relationship using data from 1964 onwards, pointing to the stability of the long-
                                                                                                                                         
24 The second-order autocorrelation is (-0.09).21
run relationship. Here, we use this function to evaluate the monetary relationships in the euro
area since the start of EMU. Note that, since our sample for estimation ends in 1997, all of
the following exercises are true out-of-sample evaluations.  
Equation (3) can be inverted to yield an equation for the velocity of M3. Figure 4
shows the actual velocity of M3 for the euro area from 1994 to 2000 together with the fitted
values from equation (3). Comparing the estimated and the observed velocities confirms the
considerable empirical stability of the money demand function. The average forecast error of
the out-of-sample forecasting exercise is 0.5 percent. Over this period, actual velocity fell by
almost 6.0 percent, consistent with the ECB’s proposition of a trend decline in M3 velocity
embedded in the calculation of the reference value for M3 growth. While the ECB interprets
this decline as a fixed trend due to changes in portfolio habits and technological changes, our
estimated model, which contains no trend, suggests that the gradual decline in velocity is a
consequence of decline in long-term interest rates since the 1980s.  
Figure 4: M3 Velocity
Figure 4 also plots a log-linear trend velocity assuming, as the ESCB does, a trend
rate of (-0.75) percent. The estimated model outperforms the trend model clearly in the first
part of the plot, where long-term rates were slightly increasing. In contrast, our long-run
money demand function overestimates velocity somewhat in 2000, while the trend model
underestimates it. Fitting a trend through the observed M3 velocity during the 1994-2000
period yields a slope parameter of (-0.43) percent with a standard error of (-0.038), which is
significantly different from that assumed in the ECB’s calculation of the monetary reference
value. The implication is that the ECB’s reference value is too large. 
4.2. Money Growth 
Apart from currency in circulation, M3 contains overnight deposits, deposits with fixed
maturities of up to two years, deposits with statutory maturity of up to three months,
repurchase agreements of financial institutions, money market fund shares and money
market paper, and bank certificates of deposit and short-term obligations of maturities up to
two years. Some of these elements of M3 are denominated in non-euro currencies, other
elements are traded in secondary markets, implying that these elements are subject to
valuation changes as their market prices change. In calculating the monthly growth rate of22
M3, the ECB purges the monetary data from these valuation changes. The ECB’s reasoning
behind this is that changes in monetary assets caused by valuation changes rather than
transactions would not cause portfolio adjustments affecting private spending behavior (ECB
2001). The empirical strength of this conjecture remains, however, unclear. 
Relative to the balance sheet data, the adjusted money growth figures severely
understate the monetary expansion from mid-1999 to early 2001. This is due mainly to the
continuous depreciation of the euro during that period. At the peak of the monetary
expansion in the Spring of 2000, the difference between the two series was about two
percent. Short of a convincing justification for the adjustment, this implies that an inflation
potential was building up in the euro area that was considerably higher than what the ECB
inferred from its indicator. In contrast, the adjusted growth rates indicate much less of a
monetary tightening after September 2000. There is, therefore, a risk that the focus on
adjusted money growth rates introduces a bias into the ECB’s monetary policy, one that
underestimates inflation risks in times of a weakening of the external value of the euro and
one that underestimates monetary tightening in times of an external revaluation.  
Figure 5: Money Growth and Interest Rates 
At the start of EMU, money growth was already higher than the reference value.
Figure 5 shows that it accelerated after April 2000 and that this was driven mainly by a very
rapid expansion of M1, which grew stronger following the decline in interest rates in the first
months of 1999. Starting in the fall of that year, M1 growth came down quickly and
substantially, responding to the rise in short-term rates. M3 growth peaked later than M1 and
came down more gradually in the second half of 2000.
The difference between the two aggregates is due to portfolio shifts from non-
monetary financial assets into the interest-bearing parts of M3. This is illustrated by the fact
that the growth rates of money market funds and short-term obligations included in M3
fluctuated between 20 and 32 percent in the six months between October 2000 and March
2001. The ECB has argued recently that a large part of this increase is due to foreign
holdings of short-term euro-denominated paper, which do not create inflationary pressures
and, therefore, should not be allowed to affect the ECB’s monetary policy (Duisenberg,
2001). Another likely reason for the rapid increase in these items is the turmoil in23
international stock markets in recent months. Taking these items out of M3 would reduce the
annual growth rate to 3.3 percent in the first quarter of 2001. This suggests that the broad
monetary aggregate tends to underestimate the extent of a monetary contraction, an
observation which resembles earlier experiences of the Bundesbank (von Hagen, 1993). The
focus on a broad aggregate thus risks to maintain a tighter stance of monetary policy for
longer than what is needed to maintain price stability. 
4.3. Money Growth and Inflation in the Euro Area
In contrast, the First Pillar of the ECB’s strategy relies on the proposition that excess
money growth in an indicator for future inflation. Figure 6 shows the growth rates of M3
together with the CPI inflation rate since 1998. Euro area money growth started to accelerate
in the fall of 1998, when inflation was still hovering around one percent. Inflation began to
accelerate in the summer of 1999, and leveled out in the fall of 2000, a few months after the
peak in M3 growth. Eyeballing thus suggests a positive relation between the two variables.
Figure 6: M3 Growth and Inflation
From this perspective, the most recent interest rate cut was justified, if the central
bank is satisfied with bringing back inflation to rates below two percent after a period of
higher rates. In contrast, an effort to bring inflation down to substantially lower rates in order
to regain an average rate below two percent over time, would have called for maintaining the
tight stance of monetary policy. Thus, the most recent decision is interesting as it indicates
that the ECB’s definition of price stability allows for base drift in the price level. 
For a more systematic analysis, we apply our long-run money demand function to the
concept of an equilibrium price level (von Hagen, 1995) or P*-model (Hallman et al., 1990)
for the euro area. We solve the money demand function for the price level that would result if
all prices adjusted immediately to current output, money and interest rates, i.e., the
equilibrium price level:
(4) pt* = mt - y
r
t + 0.023 rt
Next, we assume that the price level follows the equilibrium price level with a lag, 
(5) ∆pt =  a   +    b (p 
*
t-4 - pt-4)  + ut  24
The left hand side is the annual inflation rate. With b > 0, the actual price level adjusts
to the equilibrium price level over time. We estimate this equation using quarterly data for the
GDP deflator from 1995 to 2000. This yields the following equation:
 




 = 0.66,  F(1,24) = 42.0
t-values:   (6.5)     (6.5)
All parameters are statistically significant at the 1% level. Thus, there is a statistically
significant relationship between the observed inflation rate and the lagged difference
between the equilibrium and the actual price level. A rise in the equilibrium price level is
followed by an increase in euro-area inflation a year later. Figure 8, which plots the actual
and the fitted inflation rates against the price gap shows that the fit of this model, simple and
out-of-sample as it is, is quite high.
25 The implication is that the change in the equilibrium
price level is an indicator of the future inflation potential caused by current monetary policy. A
rising equilibrium price level indicates that the money supply is growing faster than the long-
run money demand at current income and interest rates and that this discrepancy results in
inflationary pressures.  
Figure 7: Actual and predicted inflation rates based on price-gap model 
The ECB’s main inflation gauge is HCPI inflation rather than the change in the GDP
deflator.  While consumer prices react faster to exchange rate movements and variations in
individual prices such as energy prices, one would still expect the HCPI to move in line with
the GDP deflator in the longer run. To see whether this is true, and the equilibrium price level
is a good indicator of the long-run development of the HCPI, too, we regress the HCPI
inflation rate on our price gap. Following Gerlach and Svensson (2001), we include the
change in oil prices lagged by four quarters in this regression. As before, we use data from
1995 to 2000. This yields the following regression model:  
                                                
25 There is some autocorrelation in the residuals of the regression, but the Durbin -Watson test
is inconclusive. To address the problems resulting from the use of quarterly data of annual inflation
rates, We also estimated this relationship based on quarter-to-quarter inflation rates and the price gap
lagged one period. The results are very similar.  25
(7) ∆pt  =  0.86   +   0.21 (p 
*
t-4 - pt-4) + 0.05∆poil,t-1 R
2
 = 0.74,  F(2,20) =
28.9,  
t-values: (5.9)     (6.7)               (5.4)
Again, the relationship holds quite well. Equation (7) indicates that a rise in the
equilibrium price level will result in higher HCPI inflation rates after some time. These results
are in line with Gerlach and Svensson (2001), who estimate a similar relationship between
inflation and the price gap but assume a constant velocity of money. 
The empirical exercises in this section lead us to three conclusions. First, the out-of-
sample properties of our simple velocity model suggest that money demand in the euro area
is sufficiently stable to support a monetary policy strategy that gives a prominent role to
money. Second, money is a leading indicator for inflation in the euro area. Based on these
results, the ECB could revise its strategy and pay closer attention on M3 growth in the future.
Finally, the ECB allowed M3 to grow too much during the first years of EMU. Monetary policy
thus contributed to the resurgence of inflation. Based on our calculations, the contribution of
the price gap to HCPI inflation was about one percent in early 2001. With a more disciplined
monetary policy in 1999 and 2000, the ECB could have held inflation below its two percent
limit even in the face of the oil price hike.
5. Conclusions
In this paper, we have presented a review of the institutional background, the
strategy, and the monetary policy performance of the ECB. A characteristic of this policy is
the “Two-Pillar” strategy. The strategy does not rely on any intermediate target. Its Two-Pillar
design serves to signal the ECB’s intention to prevent large and lasting monetary
contractions or expansions that would endanger price stability. It also serves as a strategic
instrument to focus deliberations on the ECB Council on monetary developments and give
them a medium-run orientation. It does not, however, constrain ECB policy much in the
shorter run nor enable the public to make informed guesses about the central bank’s policy in
times when monetary aggregates show no signs of running away in either direction. In that
sense, the strategy remains intransparent and leaves large room for discretionary
manoeuvre. Empirical results based on Taylor rules suggest that ECB interest rate moves26
were dominated by considerations focusing on economics developments in Germany and
France rather than the euro area as a whole.  
 Monetary and inflation developments of the early years are consistent with the
conjecture of a stable money demand function and a significant relationship between
monetary and price developments in the euro area. Based on these relations, the data
suggest that the ECB allowed the money supply to expand too much in the first year of EMU,
with the consequence of rising inflation later on. This illustrates the risk of a strategy that
regards monetary aggregates merely as constraints in the sense described above rather
than as intermediate targets guiding monetary policy also in normal times. By revising its
strategy and give monetary developments more weight in guiding central bank decisions
over a shorter time horizon, the ECB could improve its success in achieving price stability.
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